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A principal-agent relationship exists between hotel owners and the management companies 3 
which often operate their hotels. In addition, they both act as principals to a mutual agent, the 4 
hotel’s General Manager, who is tasked with trying to achieve each parties’ objectives. Extensive 5 
research on hotel management agreements which govern the owner-operator relationship has 6 
demonstrated that these objectives are often incongruent. However, the property-level 7 
managerial and performance implications of their goal incongruence has not been empirically 8 
examined. This study analyzes these issues using a matched sample of surveys from both owners 9 
and operators across 64 hotels operated under hotel management agreements. Using structural 10 
equations modeling, we demonstrate that owner-operator goal congruence positively impacts 11 
hotel performance and that this relationship is both mediated and moderated by the hotel General 12 
Manager’s autonomy. 13 
 14 
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How Hotel Owner-Operator Goal Congruence and GM Autonomy Influence Hotel 18 
Performance 19 
1. Introduction 20 
 Hotel owners frequently contract hotel management companies to operate their hotels 21 
through formalized hotel management agreements (HMA) (deRoos, 2010; Melissen et al., 2016). 22 
Separating hotel ownership and operations through an HMA is said to benefit both parties. 23 
Owners are able to invest in hotel real estate and access the professional operating expertise of 24 
hotel management companies. In turn, these operators can generate important income streams, 25 
expand any brands they may have, and earn profits, without having to invest in the underlying 26 
real estate (Sohn et al., 2013). 27 
 Although both parties have a vested interest in the hotel’s success, their different sources 28 
of income (see Turner and Guilding, 2010b for a review), risk profiles (Eyster, 1988), and 29 
investment strategies (Turner and Guilding, 2014) mean that they often have misaligned goals 30 
(Schlup, 2004; Turner and Guilding, 2013). Such goal incongruence is emblematic of the well-31 
established agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) whereby an agent 32 
(i.e., operator) may not always act in the principal’s (i.e., hotel owner) best interest, especially if 33 
their interests are in conflict (Mitchell and Meacheam, 2011). In order to reduce goal 34 
incongruence and improve firm performance, theory suggests that in a single agency scenario a 35 
principal will expend effort to monitor, control and/or influence its agent’s decisions and actions 36 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 37 
 Hotels under management agreement are not, however, subject to a traditional single 38 
agency relationship. Instead, they involve a complex, tripartite, ‘multiple agency’ (Child and 39 
Rodrigues, 2003) relationship between the hotel’s owner, management company, and General 40 
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Manager (GM). Within this scenario the GM acts as an agent to two principals - the hotel’s 41 
owner and its operator (Hodari and Sturman, 2014) - while the latter is also the owner’s agent 42 
(Dev et al., 2010). As such, there are potential agency problems at two distinct levels of the 43 
relationship - between the two principals (owner and operator) and between each of them and 44 
their mutual agent (the GM). 45 
 Hotels operated under a management agreement thus provide a unique context within 46 
which to study managerial and organizational performance implications emanating from a 47 
‘multiple agency’ scenario. Understanding the role of the GM is particularly important as Child 48 
and Rodrigues (2003) specifically note that while the agency theory literature has principally 49 
focused on the relationship between ownership and corporate management, it has largely ignored 50 
the second control relationship between corporate management and others in the firm (i.e., GMs) 51 
who execute its plans and policies. 52 
 Although GMs are consistently considered to be fundamental to a hotel’s success (e.g., 53 
Hodari and Sturman, 2014; Kim et al., 2015), the impact that the two principals’ goal congruence 54 
and control efforts have on GMs’ decision making, and their hotels’ performance, has not been 55 
empirically examined. In fact, while owner-operator goal congruence issues have been 56 
systematically studied with regard to HMA negotiations and contracts (Beals and Denton, 2005; 57 
deRoos, 2010; Eyster, 1997), researchers have begun to note the lack of similar knowledge about 58 
the implications of goal divergence and congruence once the management agreement has been 59 
signed and the hotel is operating under this arrangement (Guilding, 2006; Melissen et al., 2016). 60 
 This study seeks to make several contributions towards addressing this knowledge gap. 61 
First, we examine how owner-operator goal congruence relates to hotel performance. In this 62 
relationship the pivotal role of GMs is recognized as carrying potentially significant 63 
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implications. This is because GMs are typically responsible for day-to-day decision-making as 64 
they implement the hotel owner’s and/or operator’s strategic initiatives. Independently, both 65 
owners and management company executives impact GM autonomy (Hodari and Sturman, 2014; 66 
Takeuchi et al., 2008). Autonomy can also be influenced by conflicting objectives and demands 67 
from multiple superiors (Kahn et al., 1964; Rizzo et al., 1970). We thus investigate whether 68 
different degrees of owner-operator goal congruence have distinct relationships with GM 69 
autonomy. Both autonomy (Braadbaart et al., 2007) and conflicting demands (Tubre and Collins, 70 
2000) can impact managerial effectiveness. We therefore examine the link between GM 71 
autonomy and hotel performance. The mediating and moderating roles of GM autonomy with 72 
owner-operator goal congruence on hotel performance are also hypothesized and tested through 73 
our unique matched sample of surveys obtained from both owners and operators across 64 74 
hotels. Our study also contributes to the agency theory literature by specifically examining the 75 
managerial and organizational performance implications emanating from the different 76 
relationships in a multiple rather than single agency scenario. 77 
 78 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 79 
2.1. The agency problem 80 
 An agency relationship arises when there is a contract whereby one party (the principal) 81 
appoints another party (the agent) to perform some service on its behalf. However, because 82 
principals and agents often have very different and/or conflicting goals, agents frequently act in 83 
ways which are not necessarily in their principal’s best interest (Eisenhardt, 1989; Zhang et al., 84 
2015). These agency problems commonly arise when ownership and management functions are 85 
separated (Schulze et al., 2001). 86 
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 Such agency problems may be mitigated to some extent through the monitoring of agent 87 
activities (Heide et al., 2007). This is difficult for principals, however, when they suffer from a 88 
large degree of information asymmetry vis-a-vis their agent because this limits their ability to 89 
evaluate their agent’s decisions and actions (Cuevas-Rodriguez et al., 2012; Sharma, 1997). In 90 
such situations, the principal’s involvement in their agent’s decision making may help to control 91 
and/or influence the latter’s choices and actions and thus their potential for opportunistic 92 
behavior. 93 
 Agency theory has almost exclusively investigated such behavior-based control 94 
mechanisms in single agency settings involving only one agent and one principal (see Cuevas-95 
Rodriguez et al., 2012). However, due to strategic alliances and new organizational forms, there 96 
is an increasing prevalence of organizational arrangements involving multiple principals and 97 
agents (Child and Rodrigues, 2003). ‘Multiple agency’ problems arise because agency can exist 98 
at several levels of the relationships between principals, agents and an agent’s key manager. This 99 
also often produces two sets of control relationships because an agent can report to two 100 
principals. As a result, the clear hierarchical lines and formalized decision-making authority used 101 
to achieve top-down operational control and influence in single agency situations are less clear 102 
and likely less effective (Guthrie et al., 2008). Child and Rodrigues (2003) thus question the 103 
applicability of previous agency research about the nature and control of the agency problem in 104 
such scenarios and call for empirical work in ‘multiple agency’ organizational arrangements. 105 
Hotels operated under management agreement provide a unique context within which to study 106 
this phenomenon. 107 
 108 
2.2. Hotel management agreements, goal congruence and agency 109 
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 The traditional scenario whereby a hotel owner engages a GM results in a single 110 
principal-agent situation (Panvisavas and Taylor, 2008). An HMA, however, implies multiple 111 
principals and agents since not only do owners and operators both act as principals to a single 112 
agent (the GM), but because the operator is also the owner’s agent (Dev et al., 2010). Although 113 
the GM is usually an employee of the management company, given the position’s responsibilities 114 
and the HMA reporting structure, they are typically responsible to both the owner and operator. 115 
As a result, the GM is effectively the primary agent acting on behalf of both principals (Hodari 116 
and Sturman, 2014). HMAs therefore create a myriad of opportunities and incentives for 117 
multiple agents to shirk on their efforts; they require extensive and expensive monitoring by 118 
principals and are, unsurprisingly, considered to be the most problematic of all operating 119 
concepts in the hospitality industry (Schlup, 2004). 120 
 Studies of HMAs have regularly demonstrated that owners and management companies 121 
have specific and conflicting demands and expectations with regard to their respective roles, 122 
responsibilities and objectives (e.g., Beals and Denton, 2005; Eyster, 1997; Turner and Guilding, 123 
2013). For example, the vast majority of operator fees are derived as a percentage of the hotel’s 124 
sales and they may spend resources to generate these even if the owner does not receive a 125 
corresponding increase in profit (Turner and Guilding, 2013). Operators are also strategically 126 
focused on the reputation of their brands and hotel-level decisions may support this at the 127 
owner’s expense (deRoos and Wiseheart, 2016). Furthermore, because they do not share in the 128 
corresponding profit, operator decisions may not be aligned with increasing the property’s real 129 
estate value even though asset value appreciation is of paramount importance to owners (Dev et 130 
al., 2010). As such, operators may invest the hotels’ financial resources in ways that strengthen 131 
the brand’s standards and reputation even though they may not increase the value of the owner’s 132 
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underlying investment. There is also a potential ‘horizon problem’ (Turner and Guilding, 2013) 133 
because operators tend to emphasize customer relationships and long-term success of their 134 
business while owners are more likely to have a short-term focus that emphasizes payback and 135 
return. 136 
 Implications of the divergent interests of owners and operators, and the challenges arising 137 
from this split between ownership and management, have been studied and discussed most 138 
extensively with regard to the contractual relationship achieved through the HMA, including, for 139 
example, the establishment of specific clauses to better align their interests (Beals and Denton, 140 
2005; deRoos, 2010; Eyster, 1997; Schlup, 2004). The increasing demand of owners to have 141 
more say in property-level operational and managerial decisions (Beals and Denton, 2005), as 142 
well as pressure for HMAs to include performance-based incentive fees, guarantees and more 143 
generous termination clauses (Bader and Lababedi, 2007; deRoos, 2010; Gannon et al., 2010) 144 
demonstrate not only an acknowledgement that the two parties’ divergent goals require better 145 
alignment, but also that as owners they must closely monitor and control their operators, 146 
especially because owners have the ultimate burden to ensure that their hotels are properly 147 
managed (deRoos and Wiseheart, 2016). 148 
 Researchers have recently begun to empirically investigate some of the capital 149 
expenditure (Turner and Guilding, 2010a), human resources (Gannon et al., 2010) and 150 
managerial (Hodari and Sturman, 2014) implications resulting from the owner-operator split. 151 
These studies have found that the two parties’ conflicting objectives often create challenges for 152 
the management company to implement operational and strategic decisions. These challenges are 153 
often due to increased owner influence (see Beals and Denton, 2005; Eyster, 1997). Owners’ 154 
influence, however, extends beyond the corporate boardroom and contract negotiations; they also 155 
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influence property-level decisions and performance (Gannon et al., 2010; Xiao et al., 2012), 156 
which can reduce operator incentive fees (Schlup, 2004). This has led operators to complain that 157 
if their management fee is contingent upon performance then, “shouldn’t they be given the right 158 
to manage the hotel free from the owner?” (Goddard & Standish-Wilkinson, 2002, p. 8). 159 
 As the nexus between owner and operator, GMs are highly subject to the challenges 160 
which arise from their split (Guilding, 2006). Low goal congruence should have a particularly 161 
strong impact on GMs as they act as agents to both owner and operator. This is because goal 162 
incongruence between multiple principals often creates conflicting mandates for agents (Buckley 163 
and Chapman, 1997) who thus face “wrenching choices among the legitimate interests of 164 
multiple principals” (Shapiro, 2005; p. 279). 165 
 Greater goal alignment between principals, meanwhile, suggests that agents will be less 166 
conflicted about what to do, and thus be more effective. One reason for this is that aligned 167 
principals are more likely to send one clear management message to their mutual agent, thereby 168 
reducing the conflict which normally arises when one receives incompatible job demands from 169 
multiple superiors (Kahn et al., 1964). Similarly, their agent is more likely to receive a more 170 
cohesive and explicit set of tasks and directives, thereby reducing ambiguity concerning his/her 171 
role (Rizzo et al., 1970). This is important since alliances and outsourcing can increase a 172 
hospitality manager’s level of both ambiguity and conflict (Hodari et al., 2014), both of which 173 
have been repeatedly found to decrease managerial performance (see Tubre and Collins, 2000). 174 
Thus, greater goal congruence should mean that their mutual agent is less divided about which 175 
principal to serve since his/her actions are more likely to simultaneously align with each of the 176 
principals’ goals. 177 
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 Increased goal congruence between hotel owners and operators should therefore result in 178 
a more consistent, cohesive and effective set of decisions with regard to the hotel’s management. 179 
Given this, and the importance of GMs to hotel success, we hypothesize that: 180 
H1. Owner-operator Goal Congruence is positively associated with Hotel 181 
Performance. 182 
 183 
2.3. Autonomy and the hotel general manager 184 
 When multiple principals’ performance objectives are different, or in conflict, then their 185 
mutual agent’s decisions cannot be simultaneously in all principals’ best interests (Shapiro, 186 
2005).To overcome this, agency theory suggests that each principal will be incentivized to invest 187 
resources into monitoring their agent in order to exert additional control and thus better align 188 
their agent’s interests with their own rather than those of the other principal. Active monitoring 189 
of an agent’s behavior may, however, decrease managerial effectiveness and firm performance 190 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 191 
 While they are formally in charge of their hotel and are responsible for achieving 192 
property-level objectives, GMs of hotels operated under management agreement are accountable 193 
to both the owner and corporate executives in their management company’s hierarchy (Corgel et 194 
al., 2011). GM autonomy has been found to be significantly less in chain-managed hotels than in 195 
independently- managed hotels where there is only one principal (i.e., owner) (Hodari and 196 
Sturman, 2014). GM autonomy is thus likely to be contingent on the amount of goal congruence 197 
between owners and operators because greater congruence suggests a reduced need for each 198 
party to seek to influence and control the GM. As such, we hypothesize that: 199 
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H2. Owner-operator Goal Congruence is positively associated with GM 200 
Autonomy. 201 
 Greater monitoring also erodes the agent’s autonomy to make important decisions 202 
without control, approval and/or interference from higher hierarchical levels (Brock, 2003; 203 
Ouakouk et al., 2014). This is important because the discretion that autonomy provides managers 204 
with can improve their operational effectiveness (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002), resource 205 
allocation decisions (Gong et al., 2007), new product and service development (Peteraf and 206 
Reed, 2007), and firm performance (Yan et al., 2010). As such, decreased autonomy can often 207 
reduce both managerial and firm performance (Braadbaart et al., 2007; Langfred and Moye, 208 
2004). We thus hypothesize: 209 
H3. GM Autonomy is positively related to Hotel Performance. 210 
 Given the overall importance of goal congruence for hotel performance, although we 211 
expect that owner-operator congruence will be associated with greater GM autonomy, we do not 212 
expect GM autonomy to fully capture the effect of such congruence. While goal congruence 213 
should be positively related to hotel performance through its influence on GM autonomy, goal 214 
congruence should also affect hotel performance through other means. As such, we predict: 215 
H4. The effect of owner-operator Goal Congruence on Hotel Performance will be 216 
partially, but not fully, mediated by GM Autonomy. 217 
 In fact, given the importance of goal congruence for the successful performance of a 218 
hotel, we expect that the positive effects of this congruence will be greater than just its direct and 219 
mediated effects. We expect that goal congruence will be more effective when the GM 220 
simultaneously has the autonomy to act. That is, the potential value from the goal congruence 221 
can be better unleashed when the GM has the ability to act on those goals and achieve the desired 222 
  12 
 
 
results. As such we expect that in addition to its hypothesized direct (hypothesis 1) and mediated 223 
(hypothesis 4) effects, goal congruence’s relationship to performance should also be moderated 224 
by autonomy. Specifically, we posit the following hypothesis: 225 
H5. GM Autonomy will moderate the effect of owner-operator Goal Congruence 226 
on Hotel Performance, such that the positive effect of owner-operator Goal 227 
Congruence on Hotel Performance should increase with higher levels of GM 228 
Autonomy. 229 
Fig. 1 illustrates the different relationships between goal congruence, autonomy and 230 
performance. 231 
 232 
3. Methods 233 
3.1. Sample 234 
 Online surveys were distributed to hotel owner, manager and asset management 235 
associations during 2015. These included the Hospitality Asset Managers Associations (HAMA) 236 
of Asia Pacific, Middle East & Africa, and Europe, the European Hotel Managers Association, 237 
the Master Innholders, and HOFTEL. Our aim was to have both the hotel’s owner and manager 238 
(as management company representative) answer the survey so that we could generate matched 239 
response pairs for each hotel. Not only did this provide a useful way to avoid common method 240 
bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003) but also allowed us to specifically examine goal congruence in these 241 
hotels. 242 
 We asked respondents to answer the questionnaire designated for them (with GMs 243 
instructed to respond from the management company’s perspective) and to forward a link with 244 
the other party’s questionnaire to their counterpart (i.e., an owner forwarded it to the hotel’s GM 245 
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or vice-versa). Completed questionnaires from a total of 112 management companies and 89 246 
hotel owners (or their asset manager) were collected.1 This resulted in 64 matched pairs where 247 
both a GM and an owner responded for the same hotel. There were 48 GMs whose response 248 
could not be matched with an owner and 25 owners whose responses were not matched with a 249 
GM. A total of 201 individuals thus completed our survey, of which 128 formed the 64 matched 250 
pairs. 251 
 In order to assess potential concerns associated with nonresponse bias, we compared the 252 
respondents with matched data with those with unmatched data. We found that hotel 253 
performance as reported by owners (p = 0.60), GM Autonomy (p = 0.19) and GM Experience (p 254 
= 0.13) were not significantly different across matched and unmatched hotels. We thus conclude 255 
that our relatively small matched sample is representative of our total sample. 256 
We also found that (p < 0.05) matched hotels were larger (358 rooms) than those that did not 257 
match (194 rooms) and that owners of unmatched hotels reported higher performance than those 258 
of matched hotels (p < 0.05). Given this difference, we sought to determine if this could limit the 259 
generalizability of our results. It is possible that our tests for the relationship between congruence 260 
and performance may have been based more heavily on underperforming hotels; however, 261 
further examination of the performance measure suggests that this is not a substantive concern. 262 
The final sample still had a wide range of performance levels (from 1.44 to 5.81). Additionally, 263 
performance ratings were somewhat positively skewed (mean of 4.29, SD of 0.92). Thus, having 264 
a somewhat greater number of lower-performing hotels actually provided data with better 265 
distributional characteristics with which to test our hypotheses; furthermore, we are clearly not 266 
                                                          
1 Asset managers are employed by the owner to oversee the hotel’s management company. In essence, 
they represent the owner on most if not all of the hotel’s issues. 
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lacking representation from higher-performing hotels. Thus, while it is important to point out the 267 
differences discovered in our sample for completeness, subsequent examination of the data 268 
suggests that it should not have a detrimental effect on subsequent analyses or the 269 
generalizability of findings. 270 
 271 
3.2. Measures 272 
 3.2.1. Goal congruence 273 
 This was constructed by considering the level of agreement between owners and 274 
operators’ ratings about the relative priority of 21 different operational objectives across five 275 
functional areas (Human Resource, Finance, Sales and Marketing, Property, and Operations) 276 
over the following 2 years. A sample item asked “What should be the relative priority of each of 277 
the following financial choices for the hotel over the next two years?” A scale from 1 to 6 was 278 
used (where 6 indicated higher priority). 279 
 The overall measure of Congruence was computed as the Euclidian distance between 280 
each of the individual priority questions. However, to rescale the measure so that higher values 281 
indicate greater congruence, we subtracted the sum from the maximum possible (i.e., (6-1)2) 282 
value so that: 283 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = ∑ �25 − ((𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(𝑖𝑖)𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(𝑖𝑖) − 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(𝑖𝑖)𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺(𝑖𝑖))2)21𝑖𝑖=1 21  284 
 Congruence measures for each individual functional area were similarly computed, but 285 
using only the subset of items related to the specific function. These too were reverse-scored so 286 
that higher values denoted more congruence. Note that a small number of individual items were 287 
left blank by some respondents (<2%). We thus imputed missing values to avoid biases 288 
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associated with list-wise deletion and to maintain as much power as possible (Little and Rubin, 289 
2014). 290 
 The measures had acceptable (alpha > .70) reliability for each of the functional areas. 291 
These separate scales were computed for descriptive purposes. But the study’s focus is on the 292 
overall level of congruence, and the final 21-item congruence measure had a high level of 293 
reliability (alpha = 0.91). 294 
 3.2.2. GM autonomy 295 
 This was measured for each functional area (HR, Operations, Finance, Marketing, and 296 
Property) and based on an established scale (Hodari and Sturman, 2014). A sample item included 297 
“what is the relative amount of influence the GM has on each of the hotel’s financial decisions?” 298 
One item was asked for each functional area, on a scale from 1 to 5 (5 indicating higher 299 
autonomy). The final scale was computed as the average of the 5 items. The resultant scale had 300 
high internal reliability (alpha = 0.93). 301 
 3.2.3. Hotel performance 302 
 This was measured by the owners on 16 different performance aspects across the 303 
functional areas: 4 corresponded to operations; 4 to marketing; 3 to human resources; 4 to 304 
finance; and 2 corresponded to the hotel’s physical property. We incorporated non-financial 305 
measures of performance. Patiar and Wang (2016) note that while the practice of using such 306 
measures is not yet common among hotels, they are increasingly used in the wider business 307 
environment to monitor business processes and development. A sample item asked “In your 308 
opinion, how successful has the hotel been with regard to (Guest Satisfaction) over the past 12 309 
months?” Each item was evaluated on a 6-point scale (with 6 indicating higher performance). A 310 
small number of individual items were left blank by some respondents (<5%). We thus imputed 311 
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missing values to avoid biases associated with list-wise deletion and to maintain as much power 312 
as possible (Little and Rubin, 2014). The final scale was computed as the average of the 16 items 313 
and had high internal reliability (alpha = 0.95). 314 
 315 
3.3. Analytical approach 316 
 Analyses were conducted using MPlus 7.4 (Muthen and Muthen, 2015) with the 317 
maximum likelihood estimator to conduct the hypothesis tests. To test our model, we followed 318 
an item-parceling strategy (Landis et al., 2000). This method is particularly appropriate when the 319 
study focuses on the relationships between latent constructs and not specifically about scale 320 
items (Williams and O’Boyle, 2008). Previous research has shown that parceling positive affects 321 
fit indices without biasing parameter estimates (Nasser- Abu Alhija and Wisenbaker, 2006; 322 
Nasser and Wisenbaker, 2003). Specifically, we pursued a random parceling strategy by creating 323 
four parcels of four randomly selected items (without replacement). Landis et al. (2000) showed 324 
that random parceling is an effective strategy for both improving model fit and facilitating model 325 
estimation. To test the robustness of the approach, we repeated the process of creating random 326 
parcels a total of five times; however, there were no differences across the five models in terms 327 
of the statistical significance of any of the path coefficients. 328 
 To serve as a base case, and to help rule out alternative explanations for the role 329 
autonomy may have, we first conducted a baseline model (Model 1) with both GM Autonomy 330 
and Hotel Performance being predicted by four control variables: GM experience, if the owner 331 
employs an asset manager, if the GM primarily reports to the owner/asset manager (as opposed 332 
to a management company executive), and the number of rooms in the hotel. GM experience was 333 
controlled for as it has been shown to impact both autonomy (Hodari and Sturman, 2014) and 334 
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hotel performance (e.g., Guerrier, 1987). We wanted to control for the presence of asset 335 
managers because they may impact hotel performance (Singh et al., 2012), and because failing to 336 
control for their presence could provide alternative explanations for our hypothesized 337 
relationships because an asset manager represents an additional individual in the owner- operator 338 
- GM relationship. It is our understanding that in Europe, it is usually the owner that employs the 339 
GM while in the U.S. the GM is employed by the operator, and given the nature of the study we 340 
believed that the difference in to whom the GM reports could be a potentially important variable 341 
to consider. Finally, the number of rooms was used as we suspected that because of previous 342 
research, hotel size could impact hotel performance (Claver-Cortes et al., 2007). Note that 343 
because of the skewed distribution of hotel size, expressed in rooms, we used a logarithmic 344 
transformation of rooms to reduce the leverage of high values and to make the distribution of 345 
room sizes more approximate of a normal distribution. Tests of the five hypotheses then required 346 
a variety of additional analyses that built upon this base model. 347 
 3.3.1. Test of hypotheses 1-3 348 
 The first three hypotheses consider the relationships between GM Autonomy, Goal 349 
Congruence, and Hotel Performance. We used correlation analyses to look at overall effects. We 350 
also examined the parameter estimated from the structural equations model (SEM). The SEM 351 
model included a path from Goal Congruence to GM Autonomy, as well as a path to Hotel 352 
Performance. The model also included a path from GM Autonomy to Hotel Performance. 353 
 3.3.2. Test of hypothesis 4 354 
 Hypothesis 4 predicts that GM Autonomy will partially mediate the effects of Goal 355 
Congruence on Hotel Performance. For this analysis, we tested the significance of the indirect 356 
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effect using bootstrapping procedures (Preacher and Hayes, 2004; Shrout and Bolger, 2002) 357 
based on sample of 5000 draws. 358 
 3.3.3. Test of hypothesis 5 359 
 Hypotheses 5 considered the hypothesized moderation of autonomy and goal congruence 360 
in the prediction of hotel performance. To test moderation, we examined the interaction of GM 361 
Autonomy with the Congruence measure. To test the interaction, the latent moderated structural 362 
equations approach was used (Klein and Moosbrugger, 2000) using the XWITH command in 363 
Mplus (Muthen and Muthen, 2015). 364 
 It is important to note that for the latent moderated structural equations approach, model 365 
fit indices generally used to interpret the fit of SEMs—such as CFI, TLI, RMSEA, and 𝑋𝑋2—366 
have not been developed for LMS models. Instead, to determine if the model with the interaction 367 
has better relative fit, we conducted a log-likelihood ratio test (Satorra and Bentler, 2010). The 368 
test statistic for a log- likelihood ratio test is calculated using the following equation: 369 
 D = -2[(log-likelihood for model without interaction)-(log- likelihood for with 370 
interaction)], which follows a chi-square distribution with the degrees of freedom equalling, in 371 
this case, one. 372 
 373 
4. Results 374 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 375 
 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the survey’s variables. In terms of controls, the 376 
mean level of GM experience was 13.99 years, which indicates that our GM sample had 377 
substantial managerial experience and therefore the necessary inferential ability to suitably 378 
complete the questionnaire. Nearly half (48%) of our surveyed hotels had an asset manager. 379 
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About 13% of the GMs reported to the owner. The mean hotel size was 358.31 rooms. As 380 
expected, there was a reasonably large degree of difference between our smallest hotel (30) and 381 
largest hotel (3700), which is why in our subsequent regression models we use the Log of room 382 
size. Logging room size resulted in smoother normalized distribution of scores around the mean 383 
of 5.34 and standard deviation of 0.85. 384 
 Table 1 shows that the overall mean for GM autonomy was 4.16 (std. dev. 0.95) on a 5-385 
point scale, with 5 indicating higher autonomy. Moreover, the individual item level autonomy 386 
means ranged from 3.86 (for property) to 4.42 (for operations). 387 
 Overall Goal Congruence had a mean of 3.31 (std. dev. 0.35) on a scale from 1 to 6 388 
(where 6 indicated higher goal congruence). While it can be difficult to interpret mean scores 389 
with any degree of statistical accuracy, normatively a mean only around the mid-point (as is the 390 
case here) serves to demonstrate that amongst the sampled hotels, owner-operator goal 391 
congruence can only be described as moderate. 392 
 The mean level of hotel performance was 4.29 (std. dev.0.92) (on a scale of 1 to 6; 6 393 
indicating higher performance) and there was a relatively wide range of performance scores, 394 
from 1.44 to 5.81. 395 
 396 
4.2. Hypotheses 1-3 397 
 Both correlation analysis (see Table 2) and the SEM model results support Hypothesis 1. 398 
Goal Congruence was significantly correlated with Hotel Performance (see Table 3: r=0.35, 399 
p<0.01). The SEM model (see Model 2 in Table 3) had generally good fit (CFI = 0.91; TFI = 400 
0.90; RMSEA=0.09; SRMR=0.08), and was significantly better fitting than the baseline model 401 
(∆𝑋𝑋2 = 15.66; D = 15.66; dr= 2; p<0.01). Furthermore, as shown in Model 2, after controlling 402 
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for the effects of GM experience, presence of an asset manager, if the GM reports to the owner 403 
rather than the management company, and hotel size, Goal Congruence had a positive effect on 404 
Hotel Performance (B = 0.89; p<0.01). 405 
 Similar results were found for the effect of Goal Congruence on GM Autonomy. Not 406 
only is the correlation between the two significant (r = 0.30, p< 0.05), but the effect remains 407 
significant in the regression analysis after partialling out the variance attributable to the control 408 
variables (B = 0.94; p < 0.01). 409 
 The third hypothesis predicted that GM Autonomy would be positively related to Hotel 410 
Performance. The correlation between these two variables was indeed significant (r = 0.41; p < 411 
0.001), and the variable remained significant in the SEM analyses (Model 2: B = 0.32; p<0.05). 412 
 413 
4.3. Hypothesis 4 414 
 Results from the regression indicate support for Hypothesis 4. As described above, Goal 415 
Congruence had a positive effect on GM Autonomy (B = 0.94). Further, GM Autonomy had a 416 
positive effect on Hotel Performance (B = 0.32). Together, this indicates an indirect effect of 417 
Goal Congruence on Hotel Performance of 0.30 (0.94 * 0.32) (Preacher and Hayes, 2004). The 418 
bootstrapping estimate of the indirect effect (based on 5000 draws) indicates that this effect is 419 
positive (i.e., significantly greater than zero) as hypothesized (p < 0.05). Given that, even after 420 
controlling for GM Autonomy, the effect of Goal Congruence on Hotel Performance remained 421 
significant (B = 0.89, p < 0.01), this indicates that the hypothesis of partial mediation is 422 
supported. 423 
 In other words, we find support that Goal Congruence affects Hotel Performance both 424 
directly and indirectly through its influence on GM Autonomy. The indirect effect is indeed 425 
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statistically significant, but the effects of Goal Congruence are not fully explained by its effects 426 
on GM Autonomy. That is, if there are two GMs with the same level of Autonomy, the GM at 427 
the hotel with higher Goal Congruence would still be predicted to have higher levels of 428 
performance. 429 
 430 
4.4. Hypothesis 5 431 
 Finally, we predicted a moderating effect of GM autonomy on goal congruence in the 432 
prediction of hotel performance. As indicated in Model 5, the interaction of Goal Congruence 433 
and GM Autonomy is indeed significant (B = 0.65, p < 0.01). The change in the model’s log-434 
likelihood was also statistically significant (D = 5.742, df=1, p<0.05). It is also worth noting that, 435 
even with the inclusion of the interaction score, the effects of GM Autonomy on Hotel 436 
Performance remain positive and significant (at p<0.01). 437 
 438 
5. Discussion 439 
 Although there are many implicit assumptions about the managerial and performance 440 
implications of the hotel owner-operator split, the extant research literature is largely 441 
inconclusive about this. This study’s results support our assertions that goal congruence leads to 442 
superior hotel performance, causes greater GM autonomy which in turn causes greater hotel 443 
performance, and still increases hotel performance even after controlling for the effects of GM 444 
autonomy. Furthermore, our findings demonstrate that while goal congruence is important 445 
because of both these direct and indirect effects, its true value may only be realized when it is 446 
simultaneously present with higher GM autonomy. This indicates that when GMs are better able 447 
to implement plans to achieve the goals that are shared by both the hotel owner and management 448 
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company, they can best achieve greater hotel performance. These results both support and extend 449 
findings from previous studies about the agency relationship and implications pertaining to the 450 
split between hotel owners and operators. 451 
 Previous studies on how the relative power of owners and operators can shape HMAs 452 
have shown that there is often substantial disagreement during the negotiation of HMA terms, 453 
largely because the two sides have different and often conflicting objectives (deRoos, 2010; 454 
Turner and Guilding, 2010). Our finding that owners and operators have only moderate goal 455 
congruence corroborates previous researchers who have found that owner-operator goal 456 
congruence is not particularly strong (Eyster, 1988; Panvisavas and Taylor, 2008; Turner and 457 
Guilding, 2010, 2013). More importantly, it furthers our understanding about the owner-operator 458 
relationship by demonstrating that this goal disparity extends beyond the HMA negotiation phase 459 
and into when the hotel is actually operating under the management agreement. This finding is 460 
particularly important because, while HMAs are supposedly written to ensure alignment between 461 
owner and operator goals (e.g., deRoos, 2010), success on this front appears to be rather limited. 462 
Our results thus call into question operators’ frequent claims that HMAs do align the two sides’ 463 
interests. Furthermore, given that the operator is the owner’s agent, and the two sides have little 464 
goal congruence, our finding is consistent with, and supported by, the predictions of agency 465 
theory, which suggests that agents do not always act (or want to act) in the principal’s best 466 
interest (Eisenhardt, 1989; Sharma, 1997). 467 
 Although owners and operators may have little goal congruence, those relationships that 468 
do include greater congruence appear to benefit both sides. This is because we found that goal 469 
congruence impacts a hotel’s performance, with greater congruence being significantly 470 
positively related to hotel performance. This happens directly (hypothesis 1), indirectly through 471 
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GM autonomy (hypotheses 2, 3, and 4), and with greater effect when GM autonomy is greater 472 
(hypothesis 5). Combined, these results add to the growing stream of research that has focused 473 
on the relationship between a hotel owner and its management company (e.g., Panvisavas and 474 
Taylor, 2008; Renard and Motley, 2003; Turner and Guilding, 2013). More specificially, our 475 
results, from what we believe is the first such study of its kind, empirically demonstrate the 476 
positive performance implications of greater degrees of owner-operator goal congruence. 477 
 Based on our findings we argue that this goal congruence- performance relationship may 478 
be largely due to the tripartite relationship that a GM has with the property’s owner and operator, 479 
especially since the impact of congruence on performance has greater effect when the GM has 480 
increased autonomy. While researchers often suggest that GMs are vital to a hotel’s performance 481 
(e.g., Giousmpasoglou, 2014), our study supports this empirically by demonstrating that hotels in 482 
which GMs have more autonomy, and thus a greater role in shaping the hotel’s plans and 483 
policies, outperform hotels where they have less autonomy. Our findings thus confirm previous 484 
research which has found GMs to have varying degrees of autonomy (Hodari and Sturman, 485 
2014; Takeuchi et al., 2008) and extends this in an important new direction by demonstrating, for 486 
the first time, that not only is GM autonomy related to hotel performance, but that it also both 487 
mediates and moderates the effect of goal congruence on such performance. This may be 488 
because GMs are tasked with making and implementing both operational and strategic decisions 489 
that help determine the hotel’s direction and success. As such, our results also confirm the notion 490 
that decreased autonomy can reduce managerial and firm performance (Braadbaart et al., 2007 491 
and Langred and Moye, 2004). 492 
 Our study also demonstrates that within a ‘multiple agency’ scenario (Child and 493 
Rodrigues, 2003), principals with greater goal congruence provide their agents with more 494 
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autonomy than do principals with less congruence. Given our finding on the positive impact that 495 
congruence has on performance, we suggest that in a multiple-agency scenario, managers who 496 
receive a more unified directive, with a minimum of conflicting objectives, are able to pursue a 497 
more cohesive plan which results in superior operating performance. Furthermore, our finding 498 
that as GM autonomy is increased, goal congruence’s positive effect on hotel performance also 499 
increases further supports the notion that managerial autonomy is important in order to 500 
successfully implement the goals of multiple principals, and especially those which are important 501 
to the various principals. 502 
 The traditional top-down operational control often prescribed for single agency settings 503 
does not, therefore, seem to be necessarily as beneficial in a multiple agency scenario. Our 504 
findings thereby provide some support for Child & Rodrigues’ (2003) suspicion that some of the 505 
managerial recommendations emanating from traditional single agency research may not be 506 
applicable in situations of multiple agency. In fact, greater control, as demonstrated through 507 
reduced GM autonomy, was found to negatively impact hotel performance. Our findings are, 508 
meanwhile, supported by some agency theorists who have suggested that active monitoring can 509 
in fact decrease managerial effectiveness and firm performance (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen 510 
and Meckling, 1976). 511 
 Our findings may be explained by the notion that when multiple principals seek to control 512 
or influence their mutual agent, they provide conflicting “mandates” which prevent the agent 513 
from pursuing a coherent and/or cohesive set of operational and strategic choices, which in turn 514 
negatively impacts performance. Instead, we suggest that multiple principals who are themselves 515 
aligned with regard to firm objectives, may not only be less concerned with controlling their 516 
mutual agent’s decisions, but also more likely to help provide a context within which managerial 517 
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decisions can help the firm achieve internal alignment. This, in turn, not only influences the 518 
firm’s performance, but also both principals’ economic returns. 519 
 520 
6. Conclusion 521 
 This study is innovative for several reasons. First, it examines a unique agency scenario 522 
where there exists multiple principals and agents with diverse and potentially conflicting goals. It 523 
thus answers calls for empirical investigations into ‘multiple agency’ scenarios since these are 524 
notoriously difficult to study (Child and Rodrigues, 2003). Particularly novel is the fact that one 525 
principal (operator) is also the other principal’s (owner’s) agent (Dev et al., 2010), thereby 526 
creating a tripartite scenario of interaction between multiple principals and multiple agents. Our 527 
study thus adds to the agency theory literature in that while previous studies into the principal-528 
agent relationship have largely focused on the relationship between owners and corporate 529 
management, it has lacked similar depth in examining the relationship between corporate 530 
management and those within the firm that execute its plans and policies (Child and Rodrigues, 531 
2003). 532 
 Our study has also contributed to the agency theory literature by demonstrating that in a 533 
multiple agency scenario it is important for principals to have congruent objectives. Agency 534 
theory research has long demonstrated that agents may diverge from principals’ goals, and that 535 
the latter must control this. Our study has, however, also demonstrated that in multiple agency 536 
situations the principals must also ensure that their own goals are congruent as this results in 537 
greater performance, especially because of the effect this has on the principals’ mutual agent. 538 
Thus while the link between principals and agents’ objectives was already firmly established, 539 
this study has demonstrated the importance of such congruence between multiple principals 540 
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because such congruence, unlike increased control (and decreased managerial autonomy), had a 541 
positive impact on performance. Not only does such congruence improve performance, but it 542 
also means less need to control the mutual agent, thereby implicitly reducing the principals’ 543 
monitoring costs. Thus, the fears that the various principals have about an agent acting 544 
opportunistically (or in favor of another principal) due, at least in part to information asymmetry, 545 
while perhaps warranted, seem to be best attenuated by focusing on goal congruence rather than 546 
increased control and decreased managerial autonomy. 547 
 Third, it contributes to the hospitality management’s goal congruence and autonomy 548 
literatures by specifically studying their relationship, something lacking in the extant literature. It 549 
also provides a much needed examination of how GM autonomy and owner-operator goal 550 
congruence can impact hotel performance, the latter being particularly important given the 551 
important role HMAs play in the modern hotel industry structure. 552 
 In terms of our sample and methodology, it is the first study that has been able to gather 553 
and analyze the views and information from the two primary stakeholders in hotel management 554 
agreements - hotel owners and management companies. Gathering their views for the same 555 
properties meant that this study was uniquely able to match responses in order to analyze goal 556 
congruence from a joint analysis. The SEM approach we used allowed us to test our 557 
hypothesized paths in the context of the full model as indicated by our hypotheses, as well as 558 
most appropriately tested for the significance of the indirect effects. The use of the latent 559 
moderated structural equations approach (Klein and Moosbrugger, 2000) is also the most current 560 
approach for testing for moderation in an SEM model, thus allowing us to test for the 561 
hypothesized moderator while simultaneously appropriately handling the measurement error 562 
associated with the latent interaction construct. 563 




6.1. Managerial implications 565 
 This study demonstrates the need for owners and management companies to agree upon a 566 
core set of common goals for their hotels; as such, congruence is linked to superior operating 567 
performance. While each party will clearly have their own objectives, an ability to better align 568 
these will end up better serving each party as superior operating performance should ultimately 569 
result in higher fees for most operators and greater asset valuations and returns for owners. The 570 
study’s findings provide several recommendations to help hotel owners, management companies 571 
and GMs achieve such congruence and performance. 572 
 Firstly, it highlights scope for hotel owners to make better decisions prior to HMA 573 
negotiation with regard to the selection of a suitable hotel management company that has 574 
property-level goals which are well aligned with their own. Similarly, we suggest that 575 
management companies heed Gannon et al.’s (2010) warning that they often do not do enough to 576 
select owners with similar objectives. Even though HMAs may be written to help align the two 577 
parties’ interests, they may not help prevent discord if they already disagree about the property’s 578 
challenges and opportunities, and plans to address these. A healthy discussion should hopefully 579 
lead to better and more aligned objectives which should benefit not only the hotel’s performance 580 
but also both parties’ economic returns. 581 
 An owner may, as well, realize from these discussions that it should in fact defer to the 582 
management company’s plans, which could in turn also help to align their objectives. We thus 583 
also suggest that management companies fully commit to ensuring that their hotels’ owners not 584 
only know management’s plans for the property, but also the underlying reasons for these 585 
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decisions as this may help achieve owner support. Lack of such support may mean that the 586 
benefits of pursuing the operator’s property-level strategy may be undermined or even negated. 587 
 While raising one caveat to this research, the findings have an additional and potentially 588 
important implication. Due to the cross-sectional nature of this study’s data, the measured 589 
variables have been captured at a single time point. As such, we have not been able to determine 590 
whether owner-operator goal congruence is a static phenomenon or if it is dynamic over time. 591 
Inference from related research, however, suggests that it may be dynamic (see Turner and 592 
Guilding, 2013). Should this be the case, hotel owners with HMAs already in place (sometimes 593 
long-lasting) might be able to improve their hotel’s performance by working toward bridging any 594 
goal incongruence with their operator (and vice versa for the operator). 595 
 If goal congruence is dynamic, it might be beneficial for hotel owners and operators to 596 
work toward further instilling a greater degree of collaboration and flexibility into their 597 
relationship instead of potentially leaning toward a strict enactment of HMA clauses. Normative 598 
understanding of the hotel industry, for example, suggests that in some hotels their HMA may, 599 
figuratively speaking, never leave the owner and/or operator’s file cabinet. In other words, HMA 600 
contractual clauses are not relied upon nor enacted by either party. Instead, a flexible operating 601 
arrangement full of trust is enacted so that there is much give-and-take, which results in a great 602 
deal of decision-making that falls outside of what was negotiated into the HMA. By working 603 
together in this way, the relationship between a hotel owner and operator could be seen as 604 
drawing closer toward the sort of relationship which exists between the parties to a strategic 605 
alliance, who themselves are not engaged in an agency relationship but who nevertheless often 606 
have a manager as their mutual agent. 607 
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 The above point leads us to make a similar argument for providing GMs not only with a 608 
clear set of unified objectives, but also with greater autonomy as this has been shown to be a 609 
predictor of better hotel performance. GMs are thus recommended to, as much as possible, flag 610 
any incongruent goals so as to not only reduce their role ambiguity and/or conflict, but also the 611 
likelihood of under-satisfying their principals. 612 
 613 
6.2. Limitations 614 
 Although this study has demonstrated clear relationships between performance and both 615 
goal congruence and GM autonomy, we do recognize that this may be because when hotels are 616 
performing well, owners and operators may accept that the current goals, as well as GM’s 617 
decision-making, are correct, and thus there is greater congruence between the principals and 618 
more autonomy may also be granted to their mutual agent. However, the end result remains the 619 
same: hotel performance is clearly related to both goal alignment and GM autonomy. While our 620 
study was able to match the responses of both owners and operators from individual hotels, and 621 
therefore provide us with matched samples, which as far as we know is the first to do so in hotels 622 
and specifically those under HMA, it would have benefited from a larger overall sample of 623 
matched pairs. We thus acknowledge that our findings should be interpreted with some caution 624 
until additional studies with greater or different samples are undertaken. It should be noted 625 
however, that the sample size achieved is considered sufficient for a meaningful statistically 626 
powerful analysis to be undertaken. 627 
 While relevant theory was used to derive each hypothesis with requisite directional 628 
implication, causality cannot be determined from the cross-sectional survey methodology. As a 629 
result, the potential for reverse or reciprocal causality cannot be ruled out. In consequence, 630 
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further research on this question using a longitudinal methodology and examining one or more 631 
hotels and goal congruence (and the other variables of interest) at two time points would allow 632 
empirical testing of the direction of causality, as well as potentially shedding light on the process 633 
of achieving better goal congruence. It would also be valuable to supplement the asset- manager 634 
rated performance metrics with objective measures of hotel performance (RevPAR, profitability, 635 
etc.), but such data was unable to be collected as part of the current research effort. Of course, 636 
getting such data may prove quite challenging. It is worth noting that to the best of our 637 
knowledge no research to date has been able to get matched surveys from both GMs and the 638 
owners of their hotels. The uniqueness of this data allowed us to test previously untested 639 
propositions, and so although causality cannot be definitively determined, this research 640 
nonetheless helps explain how the evolving relationships between owners, operators and 641 
managers play an important role in the performance of a hotel property. 642 
 643 
6.3. Suggestions for further research 644 
 While unique in that it matched owners and operators, our sample would have been 645 
preferable had it been larger. Nonetheless the 64 owner-operator matches had sufficient power to 646 
support all of our hypotheses. This only demonstrates the importance of autonomy and 647 
congruence for understanding hotel performance. It would, however, be valuable for future 648 
research to employ our approach to further investigate issues in the interaction between owners 649 
and operators. We also note that our study may have provided different results if responses from 650 
the management company had been provided by individuals from the corporate hierarchy who 651 
oversee the hotel. GMs, as the management company employees specifically tasked with 652 
achieving a hotel’s objectives, are, however, considered to be the most informed about the firm’s 653 
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objectives for the hotel. It would thus be interesting to analyze their views with those of the 654 
management company’s corporate executives in a future study, and also with objective measures 655 
of performance such as customer satisfaction ratings, RevPAR, profitability, and related 656 
measures. It should be noted, however, that accessing a suitable number of such persons, and 657 
matching them with hotel owners, securing permission to collect such objective measures, would 658 
likely prove even more difficult than the approach we took in this study. Furthermore, most such 659 
executives oversee multiple hotels and may not, as such, be as knowledgeable about the specific 660 
goals the company has laid out for them. 661 
 Researchers could also examine goal congruence between owners and GMs of hotels 662 
unencumbered by management in order to determine if owner-GM goal congruence differs from 663 
owner- management company congruence. Findings could help clarify whether the potential 664 
agency problem is in fact greater in a multiple versus single agency setting. Similarly, we 665 
suggest investigating whether the addition of a third party, the asset manager, could also alter 666 
GM autonomy and/or goal congruence. Thus, studies with greater sample sizes and different 667 
objectives could distinguish between these four scenarios in order to demonstrate how the 668 
involvement of multiple stakeholders impacts GM autonomy, firm performance and owner-669 
operator goal congruence. 670 
  671 
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Figure 1. Relationship between congruence, autonomy and performance. 
